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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the short-term effect of school on juvenile crime. To do so, we bring together
daily measures of criminal activity and detailed school calendar information from 29 jurisdictions
across the country, and use the plausibly exogenous variation generated by teacher in-service days
to estimate the school-crime relationship. We find that the level of property crime committed by
juveniles decreases by 14 percent on days when school is in session, but that the level of violent
crime increases by 28 percent on such days. These results do not appear to be driven by inflated
reporting of crime on school days or substitution of crime across days. Our findings suggest that
incapacitation and concentration influence juvenile crime - when juveniles are not engaged in
supervised activities, they are more likely to engage in certain anti-social behaviors; at the same
time, the increase in interactions associated with school attendance leads to more interpersonal
conflict and violence. These results underscore the social nature of violent crime and suggest that
youth programs - particularly those with no educational component such as midnight basketball or
summer concerts - may entail important tradeoffs in terms of their effects on juvenile crime.
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1.    Introduction 
Juvenile crime touches millions of people in the United States each year, imposing 
substantial costs on society.  In 1997, law enforcement officials arrested 2.8 million people under 
the age of 18, accounting for one in five of all arrests that year.  Homicide is the second leading 
cause of death for youth ages 15 to 24; and juveniles are twice as likely as adults to be victims of 
serious violent crime and three times as likely to be victims of assault (Snyder and Sickmund 
1997).  Violence in schools and neighborhoods may also sharply reduce human capital 
investment by potential victims (Grogger 1997).   Economists estimate that expenditures on 
criminal justice and private protection draw $175 billion away from other productive uses each 
year (Anderson 1999).  Similarly, the cost to society of allowing one youth to leave high school 
for a life of crime and drug abuse is estimated to range from $1.7 to $2.3 million (Snyder and 
Sickmund 1999, 82).  From the perspective of the juvenile, incarceration is associated with a 10-
30 percent decrease in earnings (Grogger 1992, 1995; Waldfogel 1994; Freeman 1995; Kling 
1997; Western 2001).   
  For these reasons, researchers have long sought to better understand the determinants of 
juvenile crime.  Studies have suggested a variety of factors related to juvenile crime, including 
age (Blumstein et. al. 1986), gender (Wilson and Hernstein 1985), family background (Mocan 
and Rees 1999, Levitt and Lochner 2001), parenting quality (Daag 1991, Sampson and Laub 
1993), economic opportunities (Grogger 1998, Lochner 1999) and the severity of punishment 
(Levitt 1998).  Yet the factors underlying juvenile crime patterns and trends remain largely 
unexplained (Levitt and Lochner 2001).   
It is often suggested that one way to reduce juvenile crime is to lengthen the school day 
or school year and/or to provide activities for young people when school is not in session.  The 2 
implicit notion behind such program-oriented solutions to juvenile crime is a belief in the 
importance of incapacitation—that “idle hands are the devil’s workshop” and that keeping kids 
busy will keep them out of trouble.  Advocates of after-school and other youth programs 
frequently claim that juvenile violence peaks in the after-school hours on school days and in the 
evenings on non-school days.  Indeed, as we can see in Figure 1, violent crime does in fact 
follow this pattern.
1   
While the intuition behind such policy prescriptions is sensible, the actual short-term 
effect of school or youth activities on juvenile crime is far from clear.  First, there is no definitive 
evidence on the causal impact of youth programs on crime (Sherman 1997).  Second, the studies 
of the timing of juvenile crime tend to look within the day, but do not address the level of crime 
across days.  Implicitly, proponents of after-school program believe that lengthening the school 
day would lower crime during the afternoon without increasing violence during other periods.  
However, the fact that 57 percent of violent juvenile crime during the entire year occurs on the 
180 days school is in session (Snyder and Sickmund 1999, 57) suggests that there is an 
association between school and increased juvenile violence.  Finally, these studies do not 
consider property crimes or other non-violent crimes.   
In this paper, we carefully examine the relationship between school and juvenile crime.  
This effort will not only help us to better understand the determinants of juvenile delinquency, 
but also provide some insight regarding the potential impacts of policy initiatives such as 
lengthening the school day/year or introducing new youth activities.  Note that when we refer to 
the effect of school, we mean a short-run effect that is likely driven by day-to-day changes in the 
desire and opportunity to commit crime.  We do not examine the longer-term impact of 
                                                 
1 Snyder and Sickmund (1999) first documented this pattern using 1991-1994 NIBRS data.   
 3 
educational attainment on criminal activity that may operate through changes in the returns to 
legitimate work, the financial or psychic rewards of crime, or preferences.  There is a relatively 
well-developed literature on this latter topic.  See, for example, Witte (1997), Lochner (1999) 
and Lochner and Moretti (2001).   
To do so, we bring together data on schooling and criminal activity from a number of 
cities and towns across the United States.  To measure criminal activity, we use daily level 
reports of criminal incidents, victimizations and arrests for 29 jurisdictions from 1995 to 1999 
collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and compiled in the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS).  To this crime data, we merge school calendar data for each year 
collected from the school districts within each reporting jurisdiction.  The school calendar data 
provide precise information on when school is in session and the reason that students do not have 
school (e.g., summer, school break, national holiday or teacher in-service training), allowing us 
to exploit the considerable variation in school terms across cities and over time.    
The primary difficulty in estimating the effect of school on crime is that school days are 
not randomly distributed across the year.  Crime may be systemically higher or lower on days 
when school is not in session for a variety of unrelated reasons.  For example, there is evidence 
that violent crime increases with temperature and on weekends (Anderson et. al. 2000).  We 
address this by focusing on the variation generated by teacher in-service days—days on which 
students do not attend school that teachers use for professional development or planning 
purposes.  We argue that these days are extremely unlikely to be correlated with any factors 
influencing the level of criminal activity.  By including a series of fixed effects for 
city*month*year and day of the week, we account for other unobservable time and location 
specific factors that may be correlated with school and juvenile crime.     4 
We find that the level of property crime committed by juveniles decreases by roughly 14 
percent on days when school is in session.  In contrast, we find that the level of violent criminal 
offenses among juveniles increases by roughly 28 percent on school days.  We find little 
evidence that crime changes on the days immediately before or after school closings, suggesting 
that the changes in crime are not simply a result of substitution across days.  And several facts 
suggest that the apparent perverse effect of school on violence is not simply due to heightened 
reporting by school personnel.  The estimates for aggravated assault, a serious violent crime that 
is more likely to be reported regardless of the time or location of occurrence, are close to those 
for simple assault, a relatively minor offense that often goes unreported.
2  The pattern of results 
is similar if one excludes all crimes that take place in school or during school hours.  Finally, 
independent data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) indicates that crimes 
occurring at school are actually less likely to be reported than those occurring elsewhere.   
This analysis provides some valuable insight into the nature and motivation of juvenile 
crime.  In particular, it confirms that when juveniles are not provided with a supervised 
environment, they are likely to engage in anti-social behavior that manifests itself in increased 
property crime.  However, it also suggests that the degree of interaction among youth plays a 
significant role in the level of juvenile violence, highlighting the potentially volatile nature of 
juvenile interactions and the social nature of juvenile violent crime.   
This analysis also has several implications for policy.  First, it seems clear that policies 
that introduce after-school programs, lengthen the school year or provide other programs for 
young people will help mitigate the number of property and other opportunistic crimes 
committed by juveniles.  However, our results suggest that such policies have important 
                                                 
2 Ideally, we would like to look at very serious crimes such as murder and rape.  These crimes are extremely rare, 
however, making it impossible to estimate the effect of school on these incidents with precision.  5 
tradeoffs in relation to personal or violent crime.  Because they increase the concentration of 
young people in certain locations, they run the risk of raising the number of altercations that turn 
violent.   
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents a conceptual 
framework for understanding and identifying the school-crime relationship.  Section 3 describes 
the data used in this analysis.  Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.    
 
2.   Understanding and Identifying the School-Crime Relationship  
2.1   Conceptual Framework  
There are at least three channels through which school might influence juvenile crime in 
the short-run.  The implicit assumption behind proposals that seek to mitigate juvenile crime by 
instituting after-school or other youth programs is that school has an incapacitation effect – that 
is, it serves to keep kids busy and off the streets.  In this view, by engaging students in structured 
activities and monitoring them, school will deter adolescents from committing crime.
3  At the 
same time, however, school increases the geographic concentration of juveniles, thereby 
increasing the number of potentially volatile interactions among youth.  To the extent that 
juvenile violent crime is at least partly a function of the number of such interactions, school 
might be expected to raise the level of juvenile violent crime.  Note that this concentration effect 
need not manifest itself only during the school day or on school property.  One might imagine 
two students getting into an altercation during school and then “settling” it after school or later 
that evening in a nearby park or different neighborhood.  While the incapacitation effect will 
influence property as well as violent crime, the concentration effect will only impact violent 
                                                 
3 Note that this argument does not make any claims about the long-term value of schooling itself.  Any activity that 
engages and monitors youth might have the same incapacitation effect.  6 
crime.  Finally, school may facilitate the coordination of crime among juveniles.  That is, the 
increased concentration of juveniles may decrease the cost of planning crimes, which may in turn 
increase the observed level of juvenile crime.  While this coordination effect is likely to apply to 
both property and violent crime, we do not find evidence of it below, and thus focus our 
discussion on the incapacitation and concentration effects.
4   
This framework suggests that one must (a) consider violent and property crime separately 
and (b) clearly distinguish between the timing and the level of crime.  The fact that violent crime 
rates spike in the late afternoon on school days does not imply that the absence of school 
increases crime, but may simply reflect the effect of school on the timing of violence within the 
day.  The reasoning above implies that school will indeed decrease property crimes but may 
actually increase violent crime.  Because we examine the daily incidence of crime as opposed to 
the timing of crime (on which previous research has focused), we are able to test these 
implications. 
Note that this framework can be applied to schooling changes on the extensive margin 
(e.g., increasing the number of school days during the year by shortening the summer break) as 
well as the intensive margin (e.g., increasing the length of the school day by instituting an after-
school program).  It is also worth noting that school days could be more violent than non-school 
days even if increasing the duration of the school day reduces crime on the margin.  The intuition 
here can also be used to better understand the potential effects of other youth programs, activities 
or neighborhood amenities (e.g., parks, recreation centers, midnight basketball games).  To the 
extent that these opportunities attract a number of juveniles to the same location, they will 
                                                 
4 Coordination necessarily implies that two or more offenders are involved in the commission of a crime.  If school 
were important for the coordination of crimes, we would expect for school to have a more positive (less negative) 
effect on the incidence of crimes with multiple offenders.  In section four, we see that this is not the case.   7 
increase the number of interactions between youth, thereby raising the potential number of 
conflicts and violent incidents.   
 
2.2   Identification Strategy 
We are interested in examining the impact of school on juvenile crime, a relationship that 
can be captured by the following simple equation:  
(1)  dmyc dmyc dmyc NoSchool ime JuvenileCr ε δ α + + = ) (  
where JuvenileCrime is a measure of criminal activity on day d, in month m and year y, in city c, 
and NoSchool is a binary variable that takes on a value of one when school is not in session and 
zero otherwise.   
If the variable NoSchool is uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1), then 
δ provides an unbiased estimate.  However, it is likely that school days share certain 
unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the level of criminal activity.  Saturday, for 
example, is typically not a school day.  Insofar as more people are out shopping and at social 
events on weekends, the benefits of crime might be greater, which would tend to bias our 
estimates upwards.  This is true for the summer days as well since crime rates typically rise with 
the temperature (Anderson et. al. 2000, Jacob and Lefgren 2002).  Summer may also be atypical 
in that it is a time that families frequently go on vacation—changing the scope and venue of 
juvenile criminal activity.  Juvenile crime rates are generally lower on holidays, presumably 
because benefit of criminal activity decreases as people are at home with family and the 
opportunity cost for potential criminals increases insofar as they are attending holiday 
celebrations of their own.  This would tend to bias our estimates downwards.   8 
We address these endogeneity concerns by exploiting variation in the school term 
generated by teacher in-service days.  These are days that students do not attend school and that 
teachers use for professional development, teacher conventions, planning, or parent-teacher 
conferences.  Table 1 illustrates the distribution of teacher in-service days by city.  The first row 
shows the average across all in-service days in all cities and years.  We see that districts have an 
average of 3.67 in-service days per year, although some have as few as one and others have as 
many as eight in any given year.  Nearly 50 percent of in-service days occur on Fridays, with 
Mondays and Thursdays being the next most common days.  Half of the in-service days take 
place from September to November, with the other half equally distributed across the Winter and 
Spring months.   
While the purpose of in-service is to provide teachers with time to focus on 
administrative or professional tasks, districts occasionally schedule these days to coincide with 
school holidays (perhaps to provide a longer break for students and teachers).  For example, 
some districts schedule in-service days on the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, or the Friday 
before President’s Day.  Because one might be concerned that juvenile crime would be different 
on such days for unrelated reasons, we exclude these in-service days from our main analysis.  
More specifically, we exclude in-service days that fall within seven days of a holiday observed 
by the district or on a holiday observed by other districts (e.g. some districts hold in-service days 
on Veteran’s Day).  Such days are reclassified as breaks.  In addition, we classify early release 
in-service days as half-days, but not in-service days.  We do so because the structure of school 
tends to be very different on half-days (e.g., these days are often reserved for assemblies or field-9 
trips), making it difficult to interpret the effects of crime on half-days.
5  We later show that our 
results are not particularly sensitive to these specification choices. 
The second row in Table 1 shows the average for the remaining in-service days in all 
cities and years, referred to as the analysis sample.  While the average number of days drops by 
roughly 1.5, the distribution of in-service days across day of the week and season is roughly the 
same.  The following rows in show the results for each of the 29 cities separately.  It is clear that 
there is considerable variation across cities in the number of in-service days, with cities like 
Aurora, CO and Des Moines, IA scheduling roughly four in-service days per year while cities in 
the same state such as Colorado Springs and Iowa City offer roughly two days per year.  There is 
also significant variation within city over time.
6 
While teacher in-service days provide the most convincing source of exogenous variation 
for identifying the school-crime relationship, there are several other instances in which students 
do not attend school that warrant investigation.  Holidays and summer vacation are the two most 
obvious reasons that students do not attend school.  Holidays include days such as Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, Memorial Day and Labor Day.  While both days are clearly endogenous, we include 
them because this allows us to examine potential displacement and understanding the 
relationship is interesting.    
Finally, there are non-school days that do not fit into any of the previous categories.  
These school breaks are quite diverse in timing and purpose, ranging from days near holidays 
such as the Friday following Thanksgiving to isolated vacation days in February or March 
associated with mid-winter or spring breaks provided in many districts.  We divide these break 
                                                 
5 These days also occur most frequently at the start and end of school and before breaks and holidays. 
6  Note that Westminster, CO has no in-service days in this sample, due to the fact its fall in-services are generally 
half-day and its spring in-services are generally the Friday preceding MLK and/or President’s Day.  While 
Westminster does not contribute to the identification of our estimates of the in-service coefficient, it does help us to 
estimate the other covariates with greater precision. 10 
days into two distinct groups—idiosyncratic breaks and common breaks.  We define 
idiosyncratic breaks as those non-school vacation days that fewer than 30 percent of the districts 
have off and common breaks as those days that at least 30 percent of the districts have off.  In 
practice, this means that days such as Friday following Thanksgiving, the days surrounding 
Christmas and New Year’s are classified as common breaks while days such as mid-winter and 
spring break or other isolated vacation days are classified as idiosyncratic breaks.  Although we 
would expect common breaks to resemble holidays, we might expect idiosyncratic breaks to 
provide another plausibly exogenous source of variation with which to verify our baseline 
school-crime relationship.  
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where In-service, Idiosyncratic_Break, Common_Break,  Holiday and Summer are binary 
variables that are defined above, DayofWeek is a set of fixed effects for the day of the week, and 
CYM is a vector that includes fixed effects for the city*year*month.
7  HalfDay is a binary 
variable that takes on the value of one when students are in school for a half-day for any reason.  
The fixed effects for city*year*month fixed effects control for any unobserved time or location 
specific factors that may be correlated with school and crime.  The day-of-week dummies 
account for the fact that criminal activity may be greater, for example, on Fridays than on 
Mondays.
8  
                                                 
7 This subsumes all factors that do not vary within a given month and district.  Note that in our sample there are not 
multiple school districts within a NIBRS jurisdiction.     
8 Saturdays and Sundays to not contribute to the identification of our in-service coefficient.  We keep these days in 
the sample because (a) it is necessary in order to examine the displacement issue and (b) because some readers may 
be interested in seeing how juvenile crime varies from weekdays to weekends.  11 
Using a specification of the type described above, identification is achieved in the by 
comparing, for example, the level of crime on a Friday that is an in-service day with the level of 
crime on other Fridays in the same district and during the same month when school is in session.  
The use of district*year*month fixed effects control for all differences across districts, even if 
these difference vary from month to month.  This ensures our estimates are not biased if some 
districts have more in-service days than others.  The day-of-week fixed effects ensure that our 
estimates are not biased by the fact that in-service days are not randomly distributed over the 
week. 
 
2.3   Temporal Displacement  
Even if our results are driven by exogenous variation in school attendance, it is possible 
that school is not changing the level of criminal activity in aggregate, but merely shifting the 
time of occurrence.  For example, a juvenile who is planning to steal something from the 
neighborhood store may find it more convenient to do so on a day that he has off from school.  
Similarly, the youth planning to take revenge on a rival may choose to do so on a school day 
because he knows the other youth will be nearby or because he wants others to witness the 
attack.  In both cases, our estimates of the school-crime relationship would not capture changes 
in the total amount of crime over a longer period.        
We adopt two strategies to examine whether school is merely displacing juvenile crime. 
First, we examine the level of juvenile crime on the days just before and just after school breaks, 
holidays, and teacher in-service days.  If juveniles simply saved all of their grudges, vendettas 
and other violent acts for days when school was in session, one might expect there to be 
unusually high levels of crime on the days just before or after school was not in session to 12 
compensate for the unusually low levels of violent crime on non-school days.  Similarly, if 
juveniles shifted property crimes to non-school days, one would imagine the level of property 
crimes to be somewhat lower than usual in the periods surrounding days when school was not in 
session.  Second, we replicate our analysis using weeks as the unit of analysis rather than days.  
If teacher in-service days merely caused adolescents to shift the timing of criminal activity, we 
would not expect the relationship between in-service days and weekly crime to be much smaller 
(or non-existent) than relationship observed using daily crime measures.  As discussed in greater 
detail below, we find no evidence that juvenile violent crime is displaced.  We find that some 
evidence that juvenile property crime may be displaced partially, although school still appears to 




This analysis requires a unique combination of detailed information on schooling and 
criminal activity.  For information on criminal activity, we rely on the data provided in the 
National Incident-Based Reporting Systems (NIBRS).  NIBRS data is crucial for our analysis 
since it is the only (to our knowledge) large-scale dataset that provides information on reported 
crimes and arrests on a daily basis.  The NIBRS data is attractive for a number of other reasons 
as well.  First, the age of the victim and offender are reported.  This allows us to focus on crimes 
committed by and against juveniles.  Second, the dataset reports the nature of the crime.  Thus 
we can examine the effect of school attendance on different types of crime.  Third, the data set 
                                                 
9 Theoretically, one might extend this second strategy to examine the effect of the total number of school days in a 
year on the crime during that year.  However, it is quite difficult to find sufficient exogenous variation in the length 
of the school year to provide precise estimation with this strategy.  Almost all school districts have school in session 
for roughly 180 days per year.  Moreover, the factors that influence the length of the school year in practice such as 
adverse weather conditions (e.g., snow days) may have an independent effect on the incidence of crime.  Teacher 
strikes provide another potential source of useful variation, but are so rare (and limited to a select subset of districts) 
that they cannot be used to generate precise estimates. 13 
reports the time and location of crimes.  With this information we are able to investigate the 
effect of schooling on the time and venue of criminal activity in addition to its level.  Finally, 
NIBRS contains information on enough jurisdictions to lend statistical power to the analysis. 
The primary disadvantage of NIBRS is that it only includes information on jurisdictions 
that have agreed to participate in the system, unlike the Uniform Crime Reports, a monthly 
compilation of criminal activity collected by the FBI to which all law enforcement agencies 
throughout the country report.  In the first year of our sample, 1995, only 1,255 jurisdictions 
participated in NIBRS compared with 18,643 that reported data for the UCR.  By 1999, 2,852 
out of 19,659 jurisdictions were participating in NIBRS.   
For the purpose of our study, we chose participating cities with the largest populations.  
We focus on cities because rural or suburban NIBRS jurisdictions are often served by multiple 
school districts.  The choice of large jurisdictions maximizes the power of our estimates and 
facilitated the collection of school calendar data.
10  We ultimately ended up with 29 jurisdictions 
because the vast majority of participating NIBRS jurisdictions are extremely small towns or 
rural/suburban jurisdictions.
11  We drop roughly 2.6 percent (about 1000 city-days) of the 
observations due to missing or incorrectly reported crime data. 
While our sample is by no means representative of the nation, Table 2 shows that our 
analysis does include a reasonably diverse collection of jurisdictions that appears to reflect the 
nation along a number of dimensions.  Indeed, the percent white, black, Hispanic and Asian in 
our sample cities is virtually identical to the nation as a whole.  The same is true in terms of the 
                                                 
10 Because we include city*month*year fixed effects, cities with extremely small populations and therefore a low 
incidence of crime contribute very little to the estimation.  
11 Of the 2,852 jurisdictions that participated in NIBRS in 1999, 34 percent represented county and state police 
agencies.  Of the remaining jurisdictions (city and town police departments), only 1.5 percent (28 jurisdictions) had 
over 100,000 inhabitants.  Only 45 jurisdictions had between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.  Seventy-four percent 
of jurisdictions had fewer than 10,000 inhabitants.  The fact that most participating jurisdictions are quite small 
reflects the fact that there are many more small towns than large cities nationally. 14 
fraction of single-parent households and the fraction of the population aged 10-19.  The crime 
rate in our sample jurisdictions is considerably higher than the national average, although this is 
largely due to the fact that we are only looking at cities while the national averages contains 
suburbs and rural areas with significantly lower crime rates.  The average jurisdiction size in our 
sample is 149,414
12, ranging from towns such as Logan, UT and Nampa, ID with populations of 
40,849 and 42,737 respectively to relatively large cities such as Austin, TX and Colorado 
Springs, CO with populations of 560,389 and 357,741 respectively.  Moreover, the cities in our 
sample are spread throughout the country, with one-quarter to one-third of the sample coming 
from the South, Midwest and West.  (A complete list of the jurisdictions and years included in 
the analysis can be found in Appendix A.) 
It is worth noting that the fact that our sample is not nationally representative will not 
affect the internal validity of the estimates.  The use of city*year*month fixed effects implies 
that all identification is being achieved by high frequency variation within a school district.  As 
in all such cases, the external validity of the estimates depends on the similarity between the 
analysis sample and the sample to which one would like to make an inference.  Because of the 
diversity of our sample, we believe that inferences can be made to most cities in the U.S.   
To obtain information on schooling, we merge the NIBRS data with detailed school 
calendar data that we obtained by calling individual school districts.  The school calendars 
provide precise information on the days that students have off from school and the reason (e.g., 
summer break, national holiday, teacher in-service training, etc.).  This not only allows us to 
minimize measurement error, but also to exploit the considerable variation in school calendars 
across cities and over time within a city.   
                                                 
12 Some of the largest cities are in our sample for a relatively short period of time.  Weighting cities by the number 
of days they are in our sample and taking into account yearly changes in population, the average city size is about 
119,326. 15 
 
3.1 Measures of Criminal Activity 
Having described our data sources, it is important to describe our measures of criminal 
activity.  As noted above, NIBRS provides information on both incidents and arrests.  The 
primary advantage of arrest data for our purposes is that it allows one to determine the offender 
age with certainty.  However, because not all incidents result in an arrest, this data will tend to 
understate the true level of criminal activity and provide much less information for our 
estimation.  In order to maximize the power of our analysis, we use incident data in our main 
specifications, including all incidents for which it is possible to identify the age of the offender.  
Thus our dependent variable in the preferred specifications is the recorded number of juvenile 
offenders within a city on a given day.   
The main concern with focusing on offender data involves the prevalence of missing age 
information.  In our sample, only 10 percent of violent crime incidents are missing information 
on the offender’s age whereas roughly 59 percent of property crime incidents are missing this 
information.  If offender age were missing at random, or in a way uncorrelated with the school 
term, it would not influence the consistency of our estimates.  However, one might contend that 
offender age is less likely to be missing on school days perhaps because crimes take place right 
after school or near school premises and that police and potential victims are more cognizant of 
juveniles on such days.  If this were true, our estimates might be biased.  In the case of property 
crime—where missing data is the greatest concern—this suggests that school may decrease 
property crime even more than we find.  
We address this concern in two ways.  First, we estimate all of our models using arrest 
data, where we know the offender age with certainty, and find comparable results (see Table 11).  16 
Second, to explore whether age information appears to be missing at random, we estimate 
models similar to (2), but with the outcome variable being the fraction of reported incidents with 
no information on offender age.  Because the nature of the crimes and degree of missing data 
varies significantly across crime type, we estimate separate models for violent and property 
crime.  For both types of crime, we find neither statistically significant nor substantively 
important relationships between teacher in-service day, school breaks or summer vacation and 
the fraction of data that is missing offender age.
13  This suggests that the missing offender 
information in incident reports is unlikely to seriously bias our findings.   
Another concern involves the accuracy of the offender age information.  Fortunately, the 
existence of arrest information linked to the incident reports provides us with a way to examine 
this issue.  If the incident results in an arrest, the age of the arrestee is always collected.  In our 
sample, roughly half of reported incidents include information on the offender.  Of these 
incidents, roughly 48 percent result in arrests, which means that in about one-quarter of all 
reported incidents we have information on the offender’s age as reported by witnesses or victims 
as well as the exact age of the suspect arrested for the offense, allowing us to check the accuracy 
of reported offender age.  The correlation between reported offender age and actual arrestee age 
is roughly 0.97.
14  Moreover, of all of the offenders who were reported as juveniles (ages 5 to 17) 
by victims or witnesses, less than 3 percent were in fact 18 years or older (at the time of the 
incident) based on the arrest records, and nearly all of these 3 percent were 18 to 24 years old 
                                                 
13 On national holidays, reported property crimes are more likely to be missing offender age information, but 
reported violent crimes are less likely to be missing offender age.  This may be because a greater proportion of 
violent crime on holidays involves family members, or that property crime during the holidays includes a 
disproportionate number of home burglaries where the offender is rarely known.  Regardless, this correlation is not 
problematic since we rely on teacher in-service days in our analysis.  All of these results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
14 Because there may be more than one reported offender and/or arrestee per incident, we look at both the maximum 
and minimum ages, which also happen to have correlations of exactly 0.97.     17 
according to arrest records.  Virtually none of the offenders who were reported as 18 or older by 
victims or witnesses were actually younger than this based on arrest records.   
A final concern—reporting bias—applies to both incident and arrest data.  Both measures 
miss crime that goes unreported to the police and/or do not result in an arrest.  As long as 
unreported crime is distributed randomly, this should not influence our estimates.  However, if 
the likelihood a crime is reported is correlated with the school term, our results may be biased.  
We discuss this issue in greater length in the following section, providing evidence that reporting 
bias is not in fact driving our results.
15   
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the primary variables used in the analysis.  We 
see that there are an average of 5.2 juvenile offenders for all serious offenses with a standard 
deviation of 5.7.  The 25
th percentile is 1 and the 75
th percentile is 7.  There are no juvenile 
offenses in 6.5 percent of the city-days in our sample.   Looking at data on the key independent 
variables, we see that 23 percent of the days in our sample consist of summer vacation, 3.1 
percent consist of holidays, 2.8 percent are common breaks, 1.5 percent are idiosyncratic breaks 
and less than one percent are teacher in-service days.    
 
3.2    The Four “W’s” of Juvenile Crime 
In seeking to understand the determinants of juvenile crime, it is useful to examine who 
commits juvenile crime, what crimes juveniles most often commit, and where and when juvenile 
crimes occur.  Table 4 presents some basic descriptive statistics regarding juvenile offenders and 
their victims.  We see that offenders are most likely to be white, male and between 15 and 17 
                                                 
15 Others have used survey data to better measure the true level of criminal victimizations and to assess the degree of 
unreported crime.  Unfortunately, victimization surveys do not provide sufficient coverage to test our hypothesis.  
They also suffer from the measurement error and biases inherent in self-report data. 18 
years of age.  The victims of juvenile violent crime are generally other juveniles, with only one-
quarter of victims over the age of 24. 
Table 5 shows what types of crimes juveniles are most likely to commit.  Among serious 
offenses (as defined by NIBRS), the most common crimes committed by juveniles are 
shoplifting, simple assault and vandalism, which account for nearly half of all crimes committed 
by juveniles.  Larcency, drug violations, burglary, aggravated assault and motor vehicle theft 
account for an additional 30 percent of juvenile crime.  Very serious violent crimes such as rape 
and murder account for a tiny proportion of juvenile crime (less than one percent of serious 
offenses).  The bottom panel, which includes all offenses, indicates that the most common minor 
offenses (i.e., NIBRS Type B offenses) among juveniles include runaway, loitering, vagrancy, 
disorderly conduct and liquor law violations, which account for roughly 18 percent of all 
juvenile offenses.   
Table 6 provides a snapshot of where juvenile crimes occur.  The majority of thefts occur 
at stores or restaurants, reflecting the prevalence of shoplifting among juveniles.  On school 
days, however, roughly 7 percent of thefts occur within school buildings and, in these cases, 
presumably involve one youth stealing from another.  While over three-quarters of vandalism 
incidents take place in public places or residences, about 11 percent of all reported vandalism 
incidents on school days take place in school.  Similarly, a substantial proportion of assaults and 
drug violations take place in school.  On days when school is not in session, assaults and drug 
violations nearly always occur in public locations or individual residences. 
Figure 1 shows the timing of juvenile crime on school and non-school days.  We see that 
on school days, violent crime peaks at around 3 p.m., around the time that school gets out.  The 19 
rate then declines steadily through the evening until midnight.
16   On non-school days, violent 
crime rises gradually until the afternoon and then plateaus until after midnight.  The timing of 
property crime appears similar on school and non-school days, with the incidence of crime rising 
gradually until early evening and then declining.  
 
3.3 Estimation Strategy 
From an econometric standpoint, it is important to use an estimation strategy that takes 
into account the nature of the data.  While the simplest strategy is to estimate OLS models using 
the number of criminal incidents/offenders, this strategy has several problems.  Because criminal 
incidents are positively skewed, it is common to transform the data using logs or log rates.  
However, because we are using daily data for individual cities and we are differentiating 
between adult and juvenile crime, there are a non-trivial number of zeros in the data, particularly 
when we focus on individual crime categories—complicating the use of log crime rates.  In order 
to address these concerns, we estimate a negative binomial regression model (Greene 2000).  The 
negative binomial model is a generalization of the Poisson regression model that allows for the 
variance of the outcome measure to differ from the mean, making it appropriate for count data 
with overdispersion.  In order to accommodate the city*month*year effects in our model, we use 
the fixed effects negative binomial model developed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984).  
The coefficients represent the effect of the independent variables on the log of the mean 
incidence and can therefore be interpreted as being the approximate percentage effect of the 
independent variable on crime.   
 
                                                 
16 The level of crime around midnight is somewhat inflated because of a tendency for law enforcement agencies to 
list midnight as the time of occurrence for a disproportionate number of crimes occurring from 11 pm to 1 am.  We 
thank Howard Snyder for bringing this point to our attention. 20 
4. Results 
To get a sense of the underlying relationship between school and juvenile crime, it is 
useful to begin by looking at the raw data.  Table 7 shows the mean number of juvenile offenders 
per 100,000 residents on school and non-school weekdays.  For property crime, there is only a 
small difference between juvenile crime rates on school versus non-school days (3.5 versus 3.8).  
Insofar as summer vacations, national holidays and breaks are different than school days along a 
number of dimensions that may be independently related to criminal activity, we cannot interpret 
this difference as the causal effect of schooling.  However, if we focus on our cleanest 
comparison—between teacher in-service days and school-days—juvenile property crime seems 
to be substantially higher when school is not in session (3.5 versus 4.4).  In contrast, the juvenile 
violent crime rate appears to be substantially lower on non-school days.  For example, juvenile 
violent crime rates are roughly one-third lower on teacher in-service days compared with school 
days.  Hence, the simple comparison of means suggests that school may reduce juvenile property 
crime, but actually increase juvenile violent crime. 
One might be concerned, however, that other district- or time-specific factors could be 
driving this apparent relationship between school and crime.  For example, school districts that 
schedule many teacher in-service days may differ systematically from other school districts, or 
the scheduling of breaks or in-service days may take place during times of the year, or days of 
the week that tend to have low (or high) crime.  The following models attempt to control for such 
factors.   
Table 8 shows the results of negative binomial regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the number of reported juvenile offenders.  All regressions include a fixed effects for 
the day of the week and city*year*month fixed effects to account for static (or even slowly 21 
changing) differences between districts as well as changes in criminal activity due to the time of 
year or day of the week.   
If we consider all crimes together, there does not appear to be a strong or convincing 
relationship between school and crime.  In fact, the point estimate for teacher in-service days is 
essentially zero.  When we consider violent and property crimes separately, however, a quite 
different picture emerges.  The coefficients suggest that the level of juvenile property crimes is 
about 13 percent higher on teacher in-service days, suggesting that school decreases juvenile 
property crime.  In contrast, the point estimates indicate that juvenile violent crime is roughly 32 
percent lower on teacher in-service days, evidence that school actually increases juvenile violent 
crime.  Exponentiating the coefficients to obtain exact effects suggests that in-service days are 
associated with 14 percent more property crime and 28 percent less violent crime.  As mentioned 
earlier, school breaks unrelated to holidays and not common across districts may provide an 
additional source of exogenous variation in schooling.  If this were the case, we would expect the 
coefficients on idiosyncratic break to resemble those on teacher in-service.  We see that 
idiosyncratic breaks are associated with approximately a 15 percent increase in property crime 
and a 20 percent decline in violent crime among juveniles, confirming the school-crime 
relationships identified with the teacher in-service variable.
17   
  Column 4 presents results for other serious crimes, which consist primarily of drug-
related offenses.  The point estimate suggest that there is a modest positive relationship between 
school and drug crimes – that is, on teacher in-service days, the incidence of such crimes among 
juveniles decreases by approximately 10 percent.  However, this effect is not statistically 
                                                 
17 For simplicity in the remainder of the paper, we discuss the coefficient estimates as percentage effects with the 
understanding that these numbers are approximations, which should be exponentiated to obtain exact estimates.  22 
significant at conventional level.
18  The final column examines minor offenses, which include 
disorderly conduct, loitering, and alcohol violations among others.  The coefficient on teacher in-
service suggests that school increases the incidence of these offenses by roughly 15 percent.  
Insofar as many of these offenses are most commonly committed in groups, these results are not 
surprising.    
The other coefficients provide some additional insight into the nature and patterns of 
juvenile crime.  Juvenile violent crime is substantially lower on holidays, common school breaks 
and during the summer while juvenile property crime only appears to decline on holidays.
 19  On 
half-days, we observe 16 and 10 percent more property and violent crime respectively, although 
the interpretation of these coefficients is not clear for the reasons discussed earlier.  Weekends 
are associated with much less juvenile violent crime than other days of the week.  In contrast, 
adult violent crime is much more common on weekends.  Property crime is less common on 
Sundays and midweek than other days. 
Table 9 presents similar estimates for individual offenses separately.  For the sake of 
brevity, we report only the coefficients on in-service day.  Among violent crimes, we see that 
school appears to have a similar negative effect on both simple and aggravated assaults, although 
the aggravated assault point estimates are less precisely estimated.  With the exception of vehicle 
theft, the property crime results are all consistent with the general finding.  On teacher in-service 
days, the percent of reported juvenile offenses increases 23 percent for burglary, 24 percent for 
shoplifting, 18 percent for vandalism, and 20 percent for robbery.  Drug violations appear to 
                                                 
18 The point estimate on idiosyncratic breaks is nearly identical, and when these variables are combined, the 
estimates are marginally significant.  
19 The lack of correlation between summer vacation and property crime might be because students are more likely to 
vacation with family or engage in other forms of summer recreation as opposed to committing crime.  The small 
effect is largely driven by the fact that summer vacation appears to have a minimal effect on shoplifting.  The 
incidence of other property crime, such as burglary, robbery, vandalism, and vehicle theft does increase during 
summer vacation. 23 
decrease when school is out, though the effect is insignificant.  Curfew and loitering violations 
increase by 22 percent on teacher in-service days, but disorderly conduct among juveniles 
decreases by 51 percent.   
 
4.1 Temporal Displacement 
While the evidence above suggests that school influences the prevalence of juvenile 
crime on particular days, it is possible that school is merely causing juveniles to shift crime to 
other days and therefore does not effect the aggregate level of crime.  Table 10 provides some 
evidence on this type of displacement.  The top panel shows the results of a model that includes 
indicator variables for the three days immediately preceding and the three days immediately 
following all non-school days, in addition to all of the other covariates included in earlier 
models.  If displacement were important, we would expect the coefficients on the leads and/or 
lags to be significant and to take on the opposite sign of the in-service variable.  For violent 
crime, we see that while juvenile offenses decline by about 30 percent on teacher in-service days, 
there is no significant difference in the level of juvenile violence on the three days immediately 
before or after such days.  Indeed, the coefficients for the leads and lags are all the same sign as 
the in-service variable, and a chi-squared test indicates that the sum of these coefficients is 
significantly different from zero.
20  This suggests that school does indeed increase the level, and 
not simply the timing, of violent crime.  For property crime, the coefficients on the lead and lag 
variables bounce from negative to positive, although none are statistically significant.  The sum 
of the coefficients, however, is close to zero and is not statistically different from zero.  This is 
                                                 
20 Note that the non-linear nature of the model slightly complicates the interpretation of the sum of coefficients.  It 
may be that the baseline rates of offending are different on the days preceding or following in-service.  Thus the 
percentage effects are not perfectly comparable for the lags and leads of the in-service variable.  This is not a 
problem with linear models (e.g. OLS), which give us the same results.  Furthermore, our examination of weekly 
crime rates that we report next is not affected by this concern. 24 
consistent with displacement of property crime over the course of a week, but the lack of 
precision makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions. 
The bottom panel of Table 10 presents the results of a model in which we examine the 
effect of in-service on crime aggregated over a longer time period in order to test for 
displacement.  To do so, we sum the number of crimes over a seven-day period centered on 
Friday (the modal in-service day) and then use the same negative binomial regression framework 
to estimate the relationship between weekly crime and the fraction of the week that was an in-
service day.
21  We control for the fraction of the week composed of summer vacation, holidays, 
idiosyncratic and common breaks and half-days as well as fixed effects for city*month.  This 
specification yields coefficients that are comparable to our baseline estimates.   The point 
estimate for property crime indicates that increasing the fraction in-service from zero to one 
raises the weekly incidence of juvenile property crimes by roughly 27 percent (although the 
coefficient is only marginally significant).  The corresponding effect for violent crime is 
statistically significant and represents a decrease of roughly 56 percent.  Both of these effects are 
larger in absolute value than the corresponding one-day effects, suggesting that temporal 
displacement does not complicate the interpretation of our coefficients.  In sum, there is no 
evidence of displacement in the case of violent crime and only weak evidence of displacement in 
the case of property crime. 
 
                                                 
21 The negative binomial coefficients represent approximate percentage effects.  If we simply used the sum of in-
service days in a week as the dependent variable, we would expect a smaller coefficient than our baseline results 
because the same absolute effect of in-service days has a smaller percentage effect on weekly crime than on daily 
crime.  Using the fraction of the week composed of in-service days accounts for this difference. 25 
4.2     Sensitivity Analyses  
Table 11 presents the results from a number of different sensitivity analyses.  Perhaps the 
most serious concern involves reporting bias.  In particular, juvenile crime may be more likely to 
be reported on school days because of greater supervision on the part of school personnel or 
greater vigilance by law enforcement.
22  For example, one could imagine that a relatively minor 
fight between adolescents would not come to the attention of authorities on non-school days, but 
on school days a teacher bring the incident to the attention of law enforcement.  This differential 
reporting of criminal activity would lead us to overstate the deleterious effects of school on 
violent crime.  On the other hand, it is possible that crimes committed by juveniles in or around 
school may be more likely to be handled by school personnel and therefore not come to the 
attention of the police, in which case our violent crime estimates may actually be too low.   
The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) provides an excellent forum to 
investigate this concern.  The NCVS is an annual, nationally representative survey of roughly 
50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in order to determine the 
“frequency, characteristics and consequences” of criminal victimization in the United States.  
The NCVS collects detailed incident level data about all reported and unreported criminal 
victimizations that allow one to determine, among other things, the age of the victim(s) and 
offender(s), the time and location of the offense, the type of crime(s) committed, and whether the 
crime was reported to law enforcement.  Using NCVS data on all victimizations committed by 
juvenile offenders from 1992 to 2000, we find that reporting rates are actually lower for crimes 
committed at or near school.  This is true not only for broad crime categories such as assault, 
theft or robbery, but also for much more detailed categorizations that distinguish offenses by 
                                                 
22 Reporting bias is unlikely to be a large concern with crimes such as shoplifting and vandalism, which constitute 
the bulk of juvenile property crimes.    26 
their the severity (e.g., completed robberies with injury from serious assault, thefts of less than 
$10, simple assault completed without injury, threatened verbal assault, etc.).
23     
Despite the findings from the NCVS data, it is nonetheless useful to examine the 
possibility of reporting bias in our analysis.  One way to do so is to focus on serious crimes that 
are more likely to be reported to authorities regardless of the time or location of occurrence.  The 
NCVS data indicate that aggravated assault (defined as an attack wherein the offender uses or 
displays a weapon, or the victim suffers obvious, severe or aggravated bodily injury) is 
substantially more likely to be reported than simple assault, the most common violent juvenile 
offense.  Yet, row 2 in Table 11 shows that in-service days have approximately the same effect 
on aggravated assault as on all violent crime.
24  Another way to address the issue of reporting 
bias is to examine the timing or location of juvenile crime within the school day.  If school-
related reporting bias were driving the results, one would expect the effect to disappear if one 
looks only at crimes that take place during non-school hours or crimes that take place outside of 
school.  Row 3 examines the number of offenders committing crimes during non-school hours 
(i.e., before 7 a.m. and after 3 p.m.).  While the coefficients shrink somewhat, the pattern 
remains the same and the violent crime results are still strongly significant.  Row 4 examines 
crimes that do not occur on school grounds.  Note that this final specification reflects a very 
stringent test since it implicitly assumes that crimes reported at school would never have been 
reported had they occurred elsewhere.  Still, we find the general pattern of results remains the 
same, although the coefficient on violent crime is significant at only the 10 percent level.  
Together these results suggest that reporting bias is not driving the effects of school on crime that 
we identify here.     
                                                 
23 Tables available from the authors upon request. 
24 As mentioned earlier, it would be even more convincing to examine extremely serious crimes such as rape and 
murder, but these crimes are too rare to provide useful estimates.  27 
In addition to the concentration and incapacitation effects of school, we mentioned that 
school might facilitate the coordination of crimes committed by multiple juveniles.  If this were 
true, we would expect in-service days to affect committed by single juveniles differently than 
crimes committed by multiple youths.  In particular, we would expect to in-service days to have 
a less positive or more negative effect on crimes committed by more than one juvenile offender.  
The estimates presented in rows 5 and 6 show that this is not the case. 
  Another concern is that the timing of in-service days may correspond to events that affect 
crime more generally.  We investigate this omitted variable issue in several ways.  First, row 7 
shows estimation results of a falsification exercise in which we examine the effect of in-service 
days on adult crime.  If the in-service coefficient simply reflected an important omitted variable, 
we would expect in-service days to be predictive of adult crime as well.  We find that in-service 
days are not associated with any change in adult property or violent crime.  The specification in 
row 8 examines the effect of in-service days on juvenile crime when we control for the incidence 
of adult crime.  If in-service days were simply a proxy for the attractiveness of crime in a 
particular time or place, controlling for the adult crime rate should reduce the correlation 
between in-service days and juvenile crime.  The coefficients, however, are very similar to our 
baseline estimates.  Finally, the specification in row 9 shows that controlling for the mean 
temperature and daily precipitation—factors associated with the school calendar that have been 
shown to influence criminal activity—does not affect our in-service coefficients.   
To the extent that victims or others who report an offense cannot accurately tell the age of 
the offender, the number of juvenile offenders may be measured with some error.  If this 
measurement error is uncorrelated with the school calendar, our estimates will not be biased.  
However, one might believe that this measurement error is correlated with school being in 28 
session.  For example, on days when it is generally known that school is off, such as Spring 
break, someone who witnesses an act of vandalism from the distance may be more likely to 
report that the offender was a “kid” because he or she knows that children are not in school.  For 
this reason, the specification in row 10 uses the number of juvenile arrests—where we can be 
certain of the offender age—as the outcome variable.  The violent crime estimates from this 
model are comparable to those in the baseline model, although the property crime results are 
smaller and no longer statistically significant.  This suggests that this type of measurement error 
is not biasing our violent crime results, but may have a modest affect our results for property 
crime. 
  Another potential concern is that school may increase the number of juveniles involved in 
any given offense without actually increasing the number of offenses.  This might be true if 
would be offenders recruit accomplices in school.  In specification 11, we show results in which 
we focus on the number of offenses in which at least one juvenile is involved.  These results are 
virtually identical to the baseline estimates. 
  In our baseline specification, days are measured in a typical fashion—from midnight to 
midnight.  However, in considering the timing of daily activity, it may make more sense to think 
of crimes committed in the early morning hours (say 3 am) of Day 2 as having occurred during 
Day 1.  Consider, for example, a group of adolescents committing a series of vandalism over an 
evening.  Any acts they commit at 10 pm would count toward the total level of crime in Day 1, 
but acts they commit three hours later at 1 am, during the same crime “spree,” would count 
toward the level of crime in Day 2.  The specification in row 12 shows that reclassifying early 
morning crimes to the previous day does not change our results. 29 
  In our baseline specifications we have focused on the variation in school calendars most 
likely to be exogenous.  The specification in row 13 shows that when we expand our definition 
of in-service to include all full-day in-service days during the school year, the coefficients are 
nearly identical to our baseline estimates.  Row 14 combines our baseline measure of in-service 
days with our idiosyncratic break variable.  The estimates are now slightly smaller in absolute 
value than our baseline estimates, though they are estimated much more precisely.   
  Because concerns have been raised about the fixed effect negative binomial model,
25 we 
present results derived from alternative estimation techniques.  In specification 15, we estimate a 
Poisson regression model with the baseline covariates and fixed effects.  The interpretation of the 
coefficients is the same as with our baseline estimates.  Relative to our preferred specification, 
the effect of in-service days is somewhat smaller for property crime but very similar for violent 
crime.
26  For specification 16, we use OLS to estimate the effect of in-service days on the 
number of offenders per 100,000 inhabitants.  Note that the point estimates go in the expected 
direction and are significant for violent crime (though not property crime), even with a correction 
for possible heteroskedasticity.  Dividing the coefficients by the mean daily incidence per 
100,000 residents in our sample to obtain results that can be compared to the earlier models, we 
find that the OLS models indicate in-service increases property crime by 10 percent and reduces 
violent crime by 40 percent (the numbers presented in brackets in the table), quite similar to the 
baseline estimates.   
 
                                                 
25 Allison and Waterman (2002) have criticized the fixed-effects negative binomial model developed by Hausman, 
Hall, and Griliches (HHG) (1984), arguing that it is not a “true” fixed-effects specification in that one can still 
estimate time-invariant covariates in this model (a point made by the authors in the original article).  However, both 
sets of authors show that the HHG model yields similar results to a “true” fixed effect Poisson model, which should 
provide unbiased (though inefficient) estimates.   
26 The standard errors are incorrect in as much as there is over-dispersion in our data.  While it is theoretically 
possible to correct the standard errors, this would involve estimating all of the individual fixed-effect coefficients.  
Given that we have more than 1000 fixed effects and a large data set, doing so is not feasible. 30 
4.3  Who Wins and Loses as a Result of the Schooling Effects on Juvenile Crime  
Having demonstrated how crime varies across the school calendar, it is interesting to 
examine who wins and who loses as a result of these changes in juvenile crime.  Table 12 
presents estimates of the relationship between the number and type of reported victims of 
juvenile crime and the school term.  Not surprisingly, the true beneficiaries of schooling in terms 
of juvenile property crime are adults and institutions (e.g., shops, stores, restaurants).  We see 
that juveniles are no more or less likely to be victimized by other juveniles on teacher in-service 
days.  In contrast, the number of adults who report being victimized by a juvenile for a property 
offense increases 16 percent on such days.   
On the other hand, juveniles are the overwhelming beneficiaries of non-school days in 
terms of violent crime, consistent with the prevalence of juvenile-on-juvenile violence.  The 
number of juveniles who report violent victimization by other juveniles decreases by 37 percent 
on teacher in-service days.  However, adults also benefit from in-service days, with a point 
estimate that indicates the number of adults reporting violent victimizations by juveniles drops 
by roughly 19 percent on such days (although this coefficient is only marginally significant).  
This final result is somewhat puzzling in light of our concentration theory, and suggests that 
there may be additional mechanisms through which school influences juvenile crime. 
 
4.4   The Heterogeneity of Schooling Effects Across Juvenile Offenders  
Table 13 examines whether the effects of school vary across juvenile offenders.  Overall, 
the sign of the coefficients is invariant to race, age, gender, and residence.  Additionally, there 
appear to be only minor differences in the magnitude of effects across subgroups.  The one 
exception to this is that school appears to have no effect on juvenile property crime for black 31 
youth.  At the risk of over-interpreting the data, these results suggest that the behavior of older 
offenders is less sensitive to school, which could be the case if high-risk juveniles are more 
likely to drop out of school.  Similarly, if high-risk juveniles are more likely to dropout in larger 
cities, we might also expect juvenile crime in these cities to be less sensitive to school schedules 
than in other cities. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
  In summary, we find that school appears to reduce the incidence of juvenile property 
crime by about 15 percent, but increases the level of juvenile violent crime by nearly 30 percent.  
Our evidence suggests that these effects are not driven by reporting bias and do not simply 
reflect temporal displacement.  These findings are consistent with a theoretical framework in 
which school provides monitoring, structure, and activities that reduce property crime while at 
the same time increasing the level of interaction among adolescents, thereby raising the 
likelihood of violent conflicts.   
Our estimates suggest that lengthening the school year by one day will lead to a decrease 
of 0.29 property crimes and an increase of 0.25 violent crimes in a city with a population of 
about 120,000.
27  Given the average reported value of stolen or damaged property in our sample 
of $1,088, the reduction of property crime would result in a savings of approximately $318.  It is 
more difficult to denominate the cost of violent crime in monetary terms.  Miller, Fisher, and 
Cohen (2001) present evidence suggesting that the total cost of an assault committed by a 
juvenile is $8,515.  This figure includes the direct costs of the offense (e.g. medical care and 
foregone wages) as well intangible costs such as pain, suffering, and fear.  If we use this measure 
                                                 
27 This is calculated by the authors using estimates of the percent effect of school on property and violent crimes that 
are committed by at least one juvenile along with the average daily number of such offenses in our sample. 32 
as the cost of each violent offense, the violence associated with having school in session another 
day costs about $2,170.  In as much as school has a similar effect on unreported crimes, the true 
figures might be larger.  Additionally, there are costs associated with processing these incidents 
through the criminal justice system.
28   
While this analysis is likely to be of minimal importance for determining the length of the 
school year or the provision of summer school,
29 we believe that this analysis provides some 
valuable insight into the nature and motivation of juvenile crime.  Both incapacitation and social 
interaction models appear to be important determinants of juvenile crime.  In particular, it 
confirms that when juveniles are not provided with structured or monitored activities, they are 
likely to engage in anti-social behavior that manifests itself in increased property crime.  In 
addition, it suggests that the degree of interaction among youth plays a significant role in the 
level of juvenile violence.  The increase in violent crime induced by school attendance reflects 
the potentially volatile nature of juvenile interactions.   
Furthermore, our findings may have significant ramifications for other youth activities 
that do not have an explicit educational component, such as midnight basketball or other 
programs designed primarily to keep youth busy and “off the streets.”  The increased violence 
generated by bringing together youth may offset societal gains associated with reduced property 
                                                 
28 It is unclear how one would measure the effect of crime on the offender’s taste for future criminal activity or other 
intangible effects on the perpetrators of crime. 
29 Crime considerations are likely to be second order relative to the cost and benefits of providing schooling.  In 
particular, according to the 2000 Census, about 20 percent of the U.S. population is between the ages of 5 and 19.  
This means that reducing school by one day in the average city in our sample would reduce human capital 
acquisition by 24,000 days or 133 school years.  At any reasonable rate of return, the effects of school on human 
capital acquisition are orders of magnitude more important than the effects of school on crime.  Though smaller than 
the human capital effect, the marginal cost of employing teachers another day is also substantially more important 
than the crime effects of school. 33 
crime.
30  In general, our findings suggest that summer youth employment programs or smaller, 
neighborhood based after-school programs, that provide structured activities for adolescents but 
do not substantially increase their concentration, may be effective ways to reduce juvenile crime.   
To our knowledge, this is the first study that looks at the effect of school on the level as 
well as the timing of juvenile crime.  By highlighting the role of concentration as well as 
incapacitation, we believe that the findings presented above shed light on the nature of juvenile 
crime and provide some guidance to those developing prevention programs aimed at youth.  
Finally, the evidence provided in this paper underscores the importance of social interactions in 
analyzing individual outcomes. 
 
                                                 
30 To the extent that these programs involve a select group of youth or include components that serve to mitigate 
negative interactions or foster interpersonal relationship among youth, it is possible that they may not have the same 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Jurisdictions in the Sample  




Racial, Age and SES Composition    
Fraction White  0.732  0.751 
Fraction Back  0.148  0.123 
Fraction Hispanic  0.116  0.125 
Fraction Asian  0.028  0.036 
Fraction single-parent households  0.085  0.072 
Fraction of the population 10-19  0.146  0.145 
Crime Rate    
Reported incidents per 1,000 people  80.0  46.7 
Region    
Northeast 0.075  0.190 
South 0.233  0.356 
Midwest 0.321  0.229 
West 0.371  0.225 
City Population Size    
Average Population Size  149,414  -- 
Population is < 50,000  0.103  -- 
Population is 50,000 – 150,000  0.517  -- 
Population is 150,000 – 300,000  0.276  -- 
Population is 300,000 – 500,000   0.069  -- 
Population is > 500,000  0.034  -- 
    
Number of jurisdictions  29  -- 
Notes: The analysis sample contains summary statistics for all of the cities included in our sample.  Population 
figures weight each city equally while all other statistics are population weighted.  All information comes from the 
2000 Census with the exception of crime rates, which are calculated using data from the 1999 Uniform Crime 
Reports, compiled by the FBI.   40 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Crime and School Sessions in the Analysis Sample 








Number of Juvenile Offenders     
  All Serious Offenses 
5.242 
(5.71)  1 7 
  Violent Offenses 
1.255 
(1.90)  0 2 
  Property Offenses 
3.305 
(4.20)  1 5 
  Other Serious Offenses 
0.681 
(1.57)  0 1 
  Minor Offenses 
2.146 
(3.73)  0 3 
Number of Adult Offenders     
  All Serious Offenses 
16.368 
(18.23)  5 22 
  Violent Offenses 
5.570 
(7.17)  1 8 
  Property Offenses 
7.667 
(8.093)  2 10 
  Other Serious Offenses 
3.132 
(5.84)  0 4 
  Minor Offenses 
8.620 
(12.27)  2 10 
School Session     
   Teacher In-service  
0.008 
(0.089)  -- -- 
   Idiosyncratic Breaks  
0.015 
(0.121)  -- -- 
   Common Breaks  
0.028 
(0.164)  -- -- 
   National Holidays  
0.031 
(0.173)  -- -- 
   Summer Vacation 
0.230 
(0.421)  -- -- 
Observations 38,339     
Notes:  This table contains summary statistics for all of the days in our analysis sample.  The unit of observation is 
city*day.41 
Table 4: Who are the offenders and victims in juvenile crime?   
  Violent Crime  Property Crime  Other major 
crimes 
Variable  Offenders Victims Offenders  Offenders 
































Age 18-24  --  0.12 
(0.33)  -- -- 
Over age 24  --  0.25 
(0.43)  -- -- 








































Observations  48,130  47,162 126,719 26,121 
Notes:  This table shows the average characteristics of juvenile and adult offenders in our sample.  The unit of 
observation is the juvenile offender.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 42 
Table 5: What types of crime do juveniles commit most often?   
Serious Offenses  Frequency 
Shoplifting 0.202 
Simple Assault  0.149 
Vandalism 0.137 
All other larceny  0.070 
Drug Violations  0.070 
Burglary 0.060 
Aggravated assault  0.047 
Motor vehicle theft  0.037 
Theft from motor vehicle  0.035 
Drug equipment violations  0.033 
Theft from building  0.026 
Intimidation 0.023 
Weapons law violation  0.022 
Robbery 0.021 
Stolen property offense  0.014 
Other offenses  0.054 
Total 1.000 
All Offenses   
Shoplifting 0.144 
Simple assault  0.106 
Vandalism 0.097 
All other type B offenses  0.088 
Runaway 0.069 
All other larceny  0.051 
Drug violation  0.049 
Curfew/loitering/vagrancy violation  0.046 
Burglary 0.043 
Aggravated assault  0.033 
Disorderly conduct  0.032 
Liquor law violations  0.030 
Motor vehicle theft  0.026 
Theft from a motor vehicle  0.025 
Drug equipment violations  0.022 
Trespass of real property  0.020 
Other offenses  0.119 
Total 1.000 
Notes:  This table shows the relative frequency of each type of offense for juvenile offenders in our analysis sample.  
These results are computed for crimes for which the age of the offender is known.  Serious offenses are defined as 
NIBRS type A offenses and include primarily property, violent, and drug crimes.  Minor offenses are defined as 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: The Relationship between Reported Juvenile Offenders and the School Term 
  Dependent Variable =  
Number of reported juvenile offenders for the following offenses 
  Serious Offenses  Minor 
Offenses 
Independent 

































































































































and day of week 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  38,339 38,339 38,308 37,181  37,451 
Notes: The estimates come from negative binomial regressions.  Z-statistics are included in parenthesis.  Serious 
offenses are defined as NIBRS type A offenses and include primarily property, violent, and drug crimes.  Minor 
offenses are defined as NIBRS type B offenses and include offenses such as trespassing, loitering, disorderly 
conduct, and liquor law violations.  National Holidays include days such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year’s 
Day, Easter, President’s Day and Memorial Day.  Idiosyncratic breaks are days that a school district has off and no 
more than 30 percent of all school districts have off.  Common breaks are days that more than 30 percent of schools 
have off.  Teacher in-service days are days during the regular school year that students do not attend school and 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: The Temporal Displacement of Juvenile Crime Across the School Term 
  Dependent Variable = 
Number of Reported Juvenile 
Offenders 
  Property crime  Violent crime 
Model I     
    




























    
Sum of Coefficients  0.006  -0.697 




City*month*year and day of week fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations (days)  38,339  38,308 
Model II    
    




    
City*month*year and day of week fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations (weeks)  5,416  5,416 
Notes: All coefficient estimates come from a negative binomial regression.  Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  In 
Model I, the regressions include all controls shown in Table 8 as well as indicators for the three days preceding and 
following school breaks, holidays, and summer vacation. In Model II, the unit of observation is city*week.  We 
define weeks as beginning on Tuesday to center the week around Friday, the modal day for teacher in-service.  
Months are defined as four-week periods beginning in January, 1995 and therefore do not correspond to actual 
calendar months.  We also control for the fraction of days that are idiosyncratic breaks, common breaks, holidays, 
and summer days. 48 
Table 11: Robustness Checks 
  Dependent Variable 
Specification 
(Cells contain coefficient estimates of the 
in-service variable) 
Juvenile Property Crimes  Juvenile Violent Crimes 
Baseline 




Checking for Reporting Bias 
2  Examining only aggravated assaults  ---  -0.215 
(1.29) 
3  Considering only crimes committed 





4  Only considering crimes that do 





Determining the Importance of Coordination 
5 
Using the number of incidents 







Using the number of incidents 
involving two or more juveniles as 





Other Robustness Checks 
7  Using the incidence of adult crime as 















10  Using the number of juvenile arrests 






Using the number of incidents 






12  Assigning early morning crimes to 





13  Redefining in-service to include in-





14  Combining in-service and 





Sensitivity to Estimation Technique 





OLS regression—dependent variable 








Notes: The estimates come from negative binomial regressions.  Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  The 
regressions also include controls for summer vacation, national holidays, idiosyncratic breaks, common breaks, half 
days and fixed effects for day of week and city*year*month.  ^The square brackets contain the OLS coefficients 
divided by the mean crime rate in our sample, which yields effects that are roughly comparable to the baseline 
coefficients.   49 
Table 12:  The Relationship between Reported Victims of Juvenile Crime and the School 
Term  
  Dependent Variable = 
Number of Reported Victims of Juvenile Crime 
  Juvenile Victims  Adult Victims  Institutional 
Victims 
Independent Variable  Property Violent Property  Violent   










City*month*year and day 
of week fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  36,452 38,065 37,336  37,549 38,339 
Notes: The estimates come from negative binomial regressions.  Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  The 
regressions also include controls for summer vacation, national holidays, idiosyncratic breaks, common breaks, half-
days, and day of week.   
 50 
Table 13: The relationship between Juvenile Crime and In-Service Days by Offender 
Characteristic 
  Dependent Variable 
Sample  Juvenile Property Crimes  Juvenile Violent Crimes 
    




    
By Race of the Offender    








By Age of the Offender    








By Gender of the Offender    








By Residence of the Offender    








Notes: The estimates come from negative binomial regressions.  Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  The 
regressions also include controls for summer vacation, national holidays, idiosyncratic breaks, common breaks, half 
days and fixed effects for day of week and city*year*month.51 
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Appendix A:  Cities included in the analysis   
City  Population  Time in Sample 
Akron, OH  216,620  Jan 1999-Dec 1999 
Aurora, CO  222,460  Jan 1997-Dec 1999 
Austin, TX  560,389  Jan 1998-Dec 1999 
Boise, ID  160,702  Jan 1999-Dec 1999 
Cedar Rapids, IA  114842  Jan 1999-Dec 1999 
Cincinnati, OH  337,815  Jan 1998-Dec 1999 
Colorado Springs, CO  352,386  Jan 1997-Dec 1999 
Columbia, SC  112,539  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Davenport, IA  97,078  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Dayton, OH  168,180  Jan 1998-Dec 1999 
Des Moines, IA  191,345  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Fargo, ND  86,430  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Greenville, SC  57,168  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Iowa City, IA  61,045  Aug 1996-Dec 1999 
Idaho Falls, ID  49,023  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Lakewood, CO  139,819  Jan 1997-Dec 1999 
Layton, UT  55,901  Sep 1995-Dec 1999 
Logan, UT  40,849  Jan 1995-Nov 1999 
Minot, ND  35,033  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Nampa, ID  42,737  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Newport News, VA  180,760  Jul 1998-Dec 1999 
Provo, UT  112,001  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Sandy, UT  100,607  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Springfield, MA  148,820  Jun 1996-Dec 1999 
Twin Falls, ID  33,920  Jan 1995-Dec1999 
Waterloo, IA  63,858  Aug 1996-Dec 1999 
West Valley, UT  100,795  Aug 1998-Dec 1999 
Westminster, CO  55,617  Jan 1997-Dec 1999 
Worcester, MA  167,295  Jan 1995-Dec 1999 
Note: Inclusion in the sample was based on the availability of crime and school calendar data.  Among the cities 
listed, we excluded a small number of months in which it appeared that crimes were not reported systematically.  A 
list of these months is available from the authors. 
 